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11 Introduction
Horizontal outsourcing, where inputs or parts of the ﬁnal production of a
good are subcontracted to rival ﬁrms within the same industry, is a common
phenomenon in many industries, such as automobile, electronics, computer
and aircraft manufacturing, as well as marine insurance and architectural
design.1 For example, Alexander (1997) ﬁnds a large extent of post-award
subcontracting between ﬁrms who were rivals in competition for ‘prime con-
tracts’ from the U.S. defense department.
In the present paper, we ask how the possibility of such horizontal out-
sourcing is likely to aﬀect competition between ﬁrms in markets where non-
price competition plays an important role. Competition for big projects or
large-scale production contracts are examples where the ﬁnal allocation of
the contract to a supplier not only depends on prices, but may crucially
depend on diﬀerent types of sunk eﬀort undertaken by competing suppliers
in order to inﬂuence the buyer’s decision. For example, a potential supplier
might spend eﬀort on R&D in order to improve the quality of his product and
tailoring it to match the buyer’s needs and requirements, thereby increasing
the probability of being awarded the contract. Firms may also spend consid-
erable resources on lobbying — even direct bribes — in order to secure lucrative
licences or contracts.2
We analyze a situation where the allocation of a ﬁxed prize, interpreted
as the gross value of a licence or contract for the supply of a certain good, is
determined in an imperfectly discriminating contest,w h e r eag i v e nn u m b e r
of potential suppliers exert sunk eﬀort in order to increase the probability
of being awarded the prize. In addition to the above mentioned examples,
this model can also be interpreted as an R&D tournament, where ﬁrms spend
resources on R&D in order to obtain a proﬁtable patent, licence or production
contract.3 For example, Rogerson (1989) argues that this type of rent-seeking
framework applies well to regulatory structures in U.S. defense procurement,
where the ‘prizes’ of research contests held by the Department of Defense are
1See, e.g., Kamien et al. (1989), Spiegel (1993) and Chen et al. (2004).
2See, e.g., Konrad (2000) for a further discussion.
3See, e.g., Taylor (1995) and Fullerton and McAfee (1999).
2proﬁtable production contracts. By imposing cost asymmetries between the
potential suppliers of the good we create incentives for ex post outsourcing
of production, in case the contested prize is not awarded to the most cost-
eﬃcient ﬁrm.4
How is the possibility of ex post outsourcing likely to aﬀect ﬁrms’ choice
of eﬀort in the contest? In general, outsourcing tends to increase eﬀort
incentives for high-cost ﬁrms, due to reduced eﬀective production costs, while
the most eﬃcient ﬁrm has reduced incentives, since this ﬁrm will expect
to appropriate part of the contested prize through ex post subcontracts in
any case. More speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that the possibility of outsourcing will
increase total contest eﬀort unless there are very few contestants and the ex
post bargaining strength of the contest winner is suﬃciently low. If there is
free entry to the contest, outsourcing tends also to increase the number of
active contestants. This result sheds some new light on the common view
of horizontal subcontracting as a collusive device.5 Collusion is not an issue
in the present paper, but our results show that competition may actually
increase from subcontracting between potential suppliers.
The eﬀect of outsourcing on aggregate contest eﬀort naturally direct the
attention towards optimal contest design.6 We argue that the decision to
allow or disallow outsourcing or subcontracting is not only a potentially ef-
fective tool in contest design, it is also a tool that seems easier to support
in practice than some of the other measures proposed in the literature.7 In-
4A contest may be set up so as to avoid this mismatch problem, but it raises moral
hazard concerns: Launching a design contest and then auctioning out the production
licence can clearly lead to the winning design being produced by the lowest-cost ﬁrm.
However, a ﬁrm may then have an incentive to design a project in such a way that it is
very hard for the competitors to produce it. Furthermore, it may be of great importance
to the producers to have unlimited access to the designers during the production phase,
something which is not likely to be the case if a rival of the designer ﬁrm gets the production
contract.
5In a standard oligopoly model of international trade, Chen et al. (2004) ﬁnd that
horizontal outsourcing has a collusive eﬀect that could raise prices, while Alexander (1997)
argues that subcontracts may help facilitate collusive bidding in prime contract auctions.
6Several suggestions for designing a contest to achieve a speciﬁc objective have been
formulated in the contest literature, see, e.g., Baye et al. (1993), Fullerton and McAfee
(1999), Gradstein and Konrad (1999), Amegashie (1999,2000), Clark and Riis (2000) and
Szymanski and Valletti (2004).
7For instance, if the aim is to increase contest eﬀort, there may be a case for discrimi-
3deed, practices on these matters diﬀer, and while allowing outsourcing would
probably raise no eyebrows, neither would not accepting such schemes, since
it can easily be argued (as it frequently is) that this is needed to prevent the
diﬀusion of control and responsibility for the project in question.
If the aim of the contest designer is to maximize total eﬀort, our results
suggest — as indicated above — that outsourcing should be allowed in a ma-
jority of cases. A case to the contrary, though, is a situation with only two
contestants, where outsourcing will reduce total eﬀort if the contest winner
has suﬃciently low bargaining power in setting the terms of the subcon-
tract. However, we show that this latter result is overturned if the contest
administrator can also collect entry fees. For the case of two contestants, we
ﬁnd that outsourcing will always reduce procurement costs (i.e., the costs of
inducing a given level of eﬀort in the contest), which reinforces the policy
recommendation of allowing outsourcing.8
From a viewpoint of social welfare, increased competition for winning a
contested prize might not always be desirable, though. In situations where
a considerable amount of contest eﬀort is resources spent on lobbying or
bribes, a social planner might want to introduce measures to reduce such
competition. In order to capture this possibility, we also study the case
where all contest eﬀort is considered socially wasteful. In this case, social
welfare is equivalent to aggregate proﬁts. For the case of two contestants,
we ﬁnd that outsourcing is always socially desirable if the contest winner
has suﬃciently low bargaining power. Otherwise, outsourcing might reduce
welfare if cost asymmetries are relatively large. Since our previously discussed
results suggested that outsourcing generally leads to increased eﬀort, one
might expect that outsourcing should not be allowed in these cases if eﬀort
nating against the high-ability/low-cost contestants, by limiting their possibilities to win
the contest, in some cases excluding them from the contest altogether (see, e.g., Baye et
al., 1993, and Che and Gale, 2003). The aim is to level the playing ﬁeld and thus induce
higher eﬀort, but the approach is questionable when it comes to fair treatment in the more
common sense of the term.
8Fullerton and McAfee (1999) consider a situation where the objective of the contest
designer is to achieve a given level of eﬀort at minimum cost, deﬁned as prize money
net of entry fees. They show that, for a large class of contests, the optimum number of
contestants is two. Similar results are found by Taylor (1995) and Che and Gale (2003).
4is wasteful. However, since high-cost ﬁrms may be awarded the project,
outsourcing may increase aggregate ﬁrm proﬁts even though rent-seeking
expenditures increase.
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the only paper dealing with horizon-
tal outsourcing in a contest framework. However, the present paper relates
to several earlier contributions on horizontal outsourcing focusing on other
modes of competition. Kamien et al. (1989) analyze how the possibility
of ex post subcontracting aﬀects the initial competition for a contract in a
duopoly under price competition, where the incentive for outsourcing stems
from strictly convex production costs. Particular attention is directed to-
wards two polar cases, where either the winner or the loser of the initial
contract dictates the terms of the subcontract, and the authors ﬁnd that
competition is higher in the former case. An equivalent result is derived in
the present paper, although the framework is quite diﬀerent.
Spiegel (1993) analyses a duopoly situation which is quite similar to
Kamien et al. (1989), the important diﬀerence being that ﬁrms are assumed
to compete in quantities rather than prices.9 As in our model, but in con-
trast to Kamien et al. (1989), incentives for subcontracting arise from cost
asymmetries. Spiegel (1993) ﬁnds that ex post outsourcing is more likely to
increase social welfare if the subcontractor’s share of the outsourcing surplus
is relatively small. Unless contest eﬀort is socially wasteful, this result is also
reﬂected in the present analysis since, in our model, low bargaining strength
for the subcontractor tends to increase competition.
Another related paper is Gale et al. (2000), who consider a sequential
auction for multiple contracts with ex post subcontracting possibilities be-
tween the initial bidders. Once more, outsourcing incentives arise because
of cost asymmetries. The authors ﬁnd that the possibility of ex post out-
sourcing might make the sellers worse oﬀ ex ante. Although the framework is
quite diﬀerent from ours, this result reﬂects the situation with low bargaining
strength for the subcontractor in our model, where we show that outsourcing
might reduce ex ante aggregate proﬁts.
9Chen et al. (2004) also study horizontal outsourcing under Cournot competition, but
in a speciﬁc context of international trade.
5The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next Section we
present the benchmark model without outsourcing — a standard ﬁxed-prize
Tullock contest with asymmetric valuations. In Section 3 we introduce the
possibility of ex post outsourcing under the assumption of price competition
for the subcontract. In Section 4 we relax the assumption of price com-
petition to consider alternative mechanisms for determining the price of the
subcontract, including bilateral Nash bargaining and cooperative bargaining.
In Section 5 we discuss contest design, while Section 6 concludes the paper.
2A b e n c h m a r k m o d e l
There are n ﬁrms participating in a contest for being awarded a contract
for the supply of a good with a gross value of V . Alternatively, the set-
up can be thought of as an R&D tournament, with n ﬁrms competing to
obtain a patent, license, production contract or simply a technological lead,
which generates a revenue of V . We assume initially that the ﬁrm that wins
the contest must supply the good by producing it in-house. The ﬁrms are
diﬀerent with respect to cost eﬃciency in production, implying that their
valuation of the contested prize also diﬀer. The net valuation for ﬁrm i is
given by
Vi = V − ci,i =1 ,...,n. (1)
where ci is ﬁrm i’s cost of producing the good. We rank the contestants
according to their net valuations, so that ci ≤ ci+1,o rVi ≥ Vi+1.10
The probability of being awarded the prize depends on the relative up-
front eﬀorts of the contestants. Applying a standard Tullock framework11





where xi is ﬁrm i’s eﬀort (in monetary terms), while Sn :=
Pn
j=1 xj is total
10Net valuations are assumed to be common knowledge.
11See Tullock (1980).
6eﬀort exerted by all active contestants.12 Expected proﬁts for ﬁrm i are thus
given by
πi = PiVi − xi. (3)









Contest eﬀort is monotonically increasing in net valuation for each player. In
our setting, this means that low-cost ﬁrms exert more eﬀort than high-cost
ﬁrms in the contest. By summing over n and re-arranging (4), assuming that














is the harmonic mean of the n ﬁrms’ valuations
of the contested prize.
It remains to ensure that all n agents will actually choose to participate
in the contest.13 Following Hillman and Riley (1989), we check whether ﬁrm
n +1has an incentive to contribute a positive amount of eﬀort, given that
the other n contestants expect that ﬁrm n +1will not contribute. Since πi
is concave in xi it suﬃces to evaluate ﬁrm (n +1 ) ’s contribution incentives
at xn+1 =0 :
∂πn+1
∂xn+1






We see that ﬁrm n +1will only contribute if Vn+1 >S n. In the case of free
entry of contestants, this also provides the condition for the maximum num-
ber of ﬁrms that will enter the contest. Using (6), the number of contestants
12This success function also arises from the more elaborate probability structure pre-
sented in Fullerton and McAfee (1999). Baye and Hoppe (2003) establish the strategic
equivalence between the Tullock model and a variety of research tournaments and patent
race games.
13In a perfectly symmetric contest, it is easily shown that all n ﬁrms will participate,
and that free entry implies n →∞ . Not so when the players’ valuations of the contested
prize diﬀer.
7in a free entry equilibrium is the n lowest-cost ﬁrms, where n is the lowest
integer that satisﬁes the following condition:






From (6) it also follows, as noted by Stein (2002), that total eﬀort is always
lower than the valuation of the active player with the lowest valuation of the
prize.14
A parametric example
For later comparison, consider the following example. Suppose, like Hill-
man and Riley (1989) do, that net valuations are geometrically decreasing,
such that Vi+1 = αVi, α ≤ 1. The net valuation of ﬁrm i c a nt h e nb e
characterized as
Vi = α
i−1v, α ∈ (0,1),v > 0. (8)
Using this speciﬁcation15 in (8), total eﬀort in the contest is given by
Sn =
v(n − 1)(1 − α)
α(α−n − 1)
. (9)
It is straightforward to verify that ∂Sn/∂n < 0, which complies with the
above-stated result that total contest eﬀo r ti sl o w e rt h a nt h el o w e s tv a l u a t i o n
among the active players in the contest.
3 Outsourcing
Now we depart from the standard set-up of the previous section to allow for
ex-post outsourcing of the awarded prize. More speciﬁcally, the winner of
the contest can subcontract, or outsource, some or all of the post-contest
production activities to one of its competitors. A realistic scenario would
14For a further discussion of equilibrium existence, see e.g., Fullerton and McAfee (1999).
15Equivalently, the production costs of ﬁrm i are given by ci = V − αi−1v.
8be that only parts of the total production is outsourced (e.g., production of
some parts and components). Here, we assume — like Kamien et al. (1989)
do — that the winner can outsource the entire production of the good. This
assumption is only made for analytical clarity and does not qualitatively
aﬀect the main workings of the model.
In this model, incentives for ex post outsourcing arise from cost diﬀer-
ences in production. Thus, unless the lowest-cost ﬁrm (i.e., ﬁrm 1) wins the
contest, there will always be an incentive for ex-post outsourcing. The crucial
questions are to which ﬁrm the subcontract is allocated and how the price
of the subcontract is determined. As a starting point, we make the simple
assumption that the losers in the contest engage in a price competition for
being allotted the subcontract. In this case, the equilibrium price for the
subcontract is (marginally below) c2,a n dﬁrm 1 produces the good in all
cases.16
With this assumption, all except the lowest-cost ﬁrm maximize
πi = Pi (V − c2) − xi,i =2 ,..,n. (10)
Thus, the possibility of ex post outsourcing increases the incentives for high-
cost ﬁrms to exert eﬀort in the contest. This applies even to ﬁrms with very
high costs, which would otherwise not have participated in the contest.
Firm 1 is diﬀerent since it can produce with costs c1,i fw i n n i n gt h e
contest. However, this ﬁrm also receives a positive payoﬀ if other ﬁrms win,
since it then gets paid c2 to produce the good for the winner. Expected
payoﬀsf o rﬁrm 1 are thus
π1 = P1 (V − c1)+( 1− P1)(c2 − c1) − x1,
16The typical contest discussed in this paper is characterised by ‘design’ and ‘production’
phases. At the outset, therefore, the contest designer (if any) is not able to use this type of
auction mechanism for the ex post allocation of production. Furthermore, for the reasons
discussed in Footnote 4, it may not be desirable (or feasible) to divide the contest into two
separate design and production stages.
9which can be re-arranged to
π1 = P1 (V − c2)+( c2 − c1) − x1. (11)
Because of the positive payoﬀ from others winning the contest, we see that
ﬁr m1a l s ob e h a v e si nt h ec o n t e s tas if it had costs c2. Accordingly, ﬁrm 1
has a lower incentive to exert eﬀo r tt ow i nt h ec o n t e s t ,c o m p a r e dw i t ht h e
benchmark case without the possibility of outsourcing.
Since all ﬁrms perceive their costs to be c2,asymmetric equilibrium exists
and is given by17
xi =(
n − 1
n2 )(V − c2), (12)






(V − c2). (13)
We summarize the eﬀect of outsourcing on contest eﬀort incentives as follows:
Proposition 1 The possibility of ex post outsourcing, with price competition
for the subcontract, implies that all contestants exert the same level of eﬀort
in the contest.
Thus, ex post outsourcing with price competition levels the playing ﬁeld
completely with respect to the contest, and cost diﬀerences between ﬁrms do
not aﬀect the probability of winning. Furthermore, with respect to expected
proﬁts, only the production costs of the two most cost-eﬃcient ﬁrms matter.
For ﬁrms i ≥ 3,r e l a t i v ec o s te ﬃciencies are eﬀectually irrelevant. This follows
from the assumption that the price of a subcontract is determined by price
competition.
How does the possibility of outsourcing aﬀect total contest outlays? Let
us ﬁrst consider the case where the number of active ﬁrms, n, is constant. In
17The result that ex post outsourcing with price competition leads to a perfectly symmet-





Contrary to the benchmark case, closed form solutions for the equilibrium may then be
obtained also for r 6=1 .
10this case, the eﬀect of outsourcing on total eﬀort is determined by how much
ﬁrm 1 reduces its eﬀort relative to how much the other ﬁrms may increase
their eﬀort. This, in turn, depends on the number of contestants and the
distribution of net valuations.
Proposition 2 With n contestants, ex post outsourcing with price competi-
tion increases total contest eﬀort if V2 > V n.
Proof. Follows from a trivial comparison of (5) and (13).
For n =2 , the net valuation of ﬁrm 2 must necessarily be lower than the
harmonic mean of the two players’ valuations. In this case, the net eﬀect
is simply that ﬁrm 1 has a lower incentive to win the contest (i.e., ﬁrm 1
behaves as if it has a lower net valuation), while the objective function of
ﬁrm 2 remains constant.18 Accordingly, total eﬀort drops.19 For n>2,
however, the eﬀect on total outlays is a priori ambiguous, and determined by
the condition given in Proposition 2. It is possible, though, to say something
general about the eﬀect of the number of contestants, n. By applying the
entry condition in the benchmark contest without outsourcing, we see that
V n is decreasing in n. It follows that a larger number of contestants will
increase the probability that outsourcing leads to higher total eﬀort in the
contest. This also makes intuitive sense, since a higher number of contestants
implies that there are more high-cost ﬁrms that have increased incentives to
exert eﬀort in the contest due to the possibility of ex post outsourcing.
In the parametric example presented in the previous Section, total contest







18With only two players, price competition for the subcontract is equivalent to one of
the games considered by Kamien et al. (1989), where the terms of the subcontract is
determined by the loser of the initial contract.
19From (5) we can easily derive the eﬀect of a change in one player’s valuation on total






(n − 1)V 2
i
> 0.
11A comparison of (9) and (14) conﬁrms that the possibility of outsourcing




The left-hand side of (15) is increasing in n, implying that outsourcing lead-
i n gt oh i g h e rc o n t e s te ﬀort is more likely the larger the number of ﬁrms
participating in the contest, as we would expect.20 In fact, a closer scrutiny
of (15) reveals that total eﬀort is always higher in the outsourcing regime if
n ≥ 3. This also tallies well with the results of Stein (2002), who ﬁnd that
more similar valuations generally increase total eﬀort in a Tullock contest.
Entry
The possibility of ex post outsourcing may not only aﬀect contest incen-
tives for a given number of ﬁrms, it may also greatly aﬀect entry of new ﬁrms
into the contest. From Proposition 1 we know that the eﬀect of outsourcing
with price competition is to transform an asymmetric contest into a symmet-
ric one, which may trigger entry. With the assumption of free entry and that
there are inﬁnitely many ﬁrms able to enter the contest, we can establish the
following results:
Proposition 3 Under free entry and an inﬁnite number of potential en-
trants, ex post outsourcing with price competition leads to
(i) increased entry of ﬁrms,
(ii) increased total contest eﬀort,
(iii) under-dissipation of the contested prize.
Proof. (i) With symmetric valuations, Vi = V i = V .F r o m( 7 )i tf o l l o w s
that ﬁrm n +1has an incentive to participate in the contest as long as
20An imbedded assumption is then that all n ﬁrms would actually participate in the
contest under free entry. However, since costs are symmetric for α =1(where all ﬁrms
want to participate in the contest), there always exists a range for α where a given number
of ﬁrms will want to participate in the non-outsourcing contest. In the contest with
outsourcing, all ﬁrms would like to participate.
12n−1
n < 1, which holds trivially for all n. (ii) Since free entry implies n →∞
in the contest with outsourcing, it follows from a comparison of (5) and (13)







From the entry condition in the asymmetric contest we know that, in equi-
librium, the right-hand side of (16) is decreasing in n. Thus, it suﬃces to
check for n =2 . In this case, the condition reduces to
V 2
2
V1+V2 > 0,w h i c h
is trivially true. (iii) In the free entry equilibrium, total contest outlays are
given by V −c2, while production costs are c1. Thus, rent dissipation is given
by V −c2+c1
V < 1.
When outsourcing is possible, ﬁrms that would otherwise not ﬁnd it prof-
itable, will enter the contest if entry is free. Price competition for the subcon-
tract implies that the eﬀective cost of all ﬁrms except the most cost-eﬃcient,
is c2, which triggers entry of new ﬁrms. In a free entry equilibrium, this
means that total contest outlays increase. Furthermore, since own produc-
tion costs do not matter for expected proﬁts, an interesting implication of the
equilibrium derived in this Section is that ﬁrms that are not able proﬁtably
to produce the good themselves have incentives to participate in the contest
if they can outsource production to a lower-cost ﬁrm ex post.
Once more, we can illustrate our results by applying the parametric ex-
ample from Section 2. In the asymmetric contest without outsourcing,t h e
number of ﬁrms, n, participating in the contest under free entry is given by




(n − 1)(1 − α)
α(α−n − 1)
. (17)
Assume that α =0 .9. This yields n =5 , and total contest outlays in
equilibrium are approximately 0.64v. On the other hand, if these 5 ﬁrms
enter the contest with the possibility of ex post outsourcing, total contest
eﬀort is given by (14), which in this example amounts to 0.72v. Finally, if
13there are inﬁnitely many potential entrants to the contest, the possibility of
outsourcing produces a total contest outlay of 0.9v. Thus, outsourcing leads
to more rent dissipation, and the possibility of additional entry reinforces
this eﬀect.
Summing up, the results of this Section suggest that rent-seeking will
generally be higher with outsourcing than without. The only clear-cut case
to the contrary, is when there are only two potential contestants, in which
case contest eﬀort is certain to fall.
4 Bargaining
In the analysis thus far we have assumed that, in case of outsourcing, the
terms of the subcontract are determined by price competition among the
potential subcontractors. Although this is, in some sense, a natural assump-
tion, it also yields implications that might seem somewhat unrealistic. In
particular, it seems reasonable to argue that a ﬁrm’s own production costs
should somehow aﬀect its expected proﬁts in the contest. Furthermore, pure
price competition might be a particularly strong assumption in the case of
few contestants. For example, with only two contestants, price competition
for the subcontract implies that the losing ﬁrm unilaterally determines the
price of the subcontract, which is a somewhat extreme assumption. In order
to deal with these concerns, we relax the assumption of price competition
and assume that, in case of outsourcing, the terms of the subcontract is
determined in bargaining. We consider two diﬀerent cases; bilateral Nash
bargaining between the contest winner and the lowest-cost ﬁrm, and cooper-
ative bargaining among the winner and all lower-cost ﬁrms.
4.1 Bilateral Nash bargaining
Assume that, upon winning the contest, ﬁrm i (≥ 2) c a ng ot oo n l yo n eﬁrm
for negotiating a possible subcontract. This would be a reasonable scenario if
bargaining costs are high. We assume that the winner always maximizes the
total surplus of outsourcing by approaching ﬁr m1t on e g o t i a t et h et e r m so f
14a subcontract, and that the payoﬀ to each party is given by the asymmetric
Nash bargaining solution. We let the bargaining power of the contest winner
be given by β ∈ (0,1). This implies that outsourcing transforms the eﬀective
costs of ﬁrm i from ci to (1 − β)ci + βc1.21
Under these assumptions, the maximand of ﬁrm i ≥ 2 is
πi = Pi (V − (1 − β)ci − βc1) − xi,i =2 ,..,n, (18)
while ﬁrm 1 maximizes
π1 = P1 (V − c1)+( 1− β)
n X
i=2
[Pi (ci − c1)] − x1. (19)
The ﬁr s to b s e r v a t i o nw o r t hm a k i n gi st h a t ,u n l i k ef o rt h ec a s eo fp u r ep r i c e
competition for the subcontract, the contest is generally asymmetric. This
means that the participation condition given in (7) applies.
Maximizing (18) and (19), the ﬁrst order conditions for ﬁrm 1 and for





















V − (1 − β)ci − βc1
¶¸
. (21)
Inserting (21) into (20) and aggregating, we arrive — after some manipu-












(ci − c1) (22)
We can summarize the characteristics of the contest equilibrium as follows:
Proposition 4 With ex post outsourcing and bilateral Nash bargaining for
21This cost could also arise if, for instance, the contest winner were able to make a
credible take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to ﬁrm 1, but had to do a portion (1−β) of the production
himself.
15the price of the subcontract, then
( i )t h ec o n t e s ti sa s y m m e t r i ci fβ<1 and n>2,
(ii) total contest eﬀort increases in β,
(iii) the contested prize is fully dissipated under free entry if β → 1.
Proof. Follows straightforwardly from (18)-(22).
The bargaining parameter β plays a crucial role for the ﬁrms’ behavior
in the contest. From the payoﬀ functions and the ﬁrst-order conditions, we
s e et h a tah i g h e rv a l u eo fβ eﬀectually contributes to making the contest
more symmetric, which increases total eﬀort in the contest equilibrium. In-
tuitively, a higher value of β means that the lowest-cost ﬁrm gets stronger
incentives to win the contest, since the expected terms of the subcontract
will be worse, from ﬁrm 1’s viewpoint, if another ﬁrm wins the contest. On
the other hand, since a higher value of β implies that all other ﬁrms i ≥ 2
will have lower eﬀective costs if winning the contests, these ﬁrms are also
spurred to exert more contest eﬀort.22 In the limit case, β → 1,w h e r et h e
winner of the contest has all bargaining power in determining the price of





(V − c1). Thus, free
entry will contribute to full rent-dissipation if β → 1,s o m e t h i n gt h a tw a s
not possible with price competition for the subcontract.23
It is also clear that if n and β are suﬃciently low, outsourcing with
Nash bargaining can reduce total contest eﬀort compared with the case of
no outsourcing.24 For the special case of β =0 , rent-seeking is actually
reduced regardless of the number of ﬁrms. One might view this result with
some scepticism, though. If ﬁrm i wins the contest and has low bargaining
strength, the agreed price (and hence, the eﬀective cost of ﬁrm i) will be
close to ﬁrm i’s own costs, even though these may far exceed the production
22For the case of n =2 ,t h ee ﬀect of an increase in β on the eﬀort incentives of both
ﬁrms are equally strong, implying that the contest remains symmetric for all β ∈ (0,1).
23The extreme case of β → 1 corresponds to the other of the (two-player) games con-
sidered by Kamien et al. (1989), where the terms of the subcontract is determined by the
winner of the initial contract.
24For example, if n =2and β =0 , the price for the subcontract if ﬁrm 2 wins will
be identical under Nash bargaining and price competition. In this case, the terms of the
subcontract are eﬀectually determined by the loser of the contest, and we have already
seen that this reduces total eﬀort.
16costs of other low-cost ﬁrms. Incentives to bargain with other ﬁrms thus
naturally emerge. Let us therefore restrict attention to situations where the
agreed price is actually lower than or equal to c2,i . e . ,(1 − β)ci + βc1 ≤ c2.
This places a lower bound on β,g i v e nb yβ := (ci − c2)/(ci − c1).I f w e
let superscripts PC and NB denote price competition and Nash bargaining,























Thus, with the assumption that the bargained price should be better than
any feasible alternative, total contest eﬀort under Nash bargaining is never
less extensive than in the price-competition case.25
4.2 Cooperative bargaining
As we have just indicated, a potentially crucial feature of the above outlined
model with bilateral Nash bargaining is that the existence of outside oppor-
tunities does not aﬀect the bargaining position. In other words, if the contest
is won by a ﬁrm i ≥ 2, the bargaining parameter β is independent of the
number of other ﬁrms with lower costs than the winner. We now proceed to
relax this assumption by applying a cooperative bargaining framework and
use the Shapley value as an approximation to the expected earnings of a ﬁrm.
The Shapley value of ﬁrm i is given by the average contribution i gives to
any coalition of the other ﬁrms. Let M be the set of ﬁr m si ns u c hac o a l i t i o n
and N b et h et o t a ls e to fﬁrms. |N| = n and |M| = m denote the number
of ﬁrms in N and M, respectively. Finally, let Π(K) denote the proﬁtt h a t
ac o a l i t i o nK can get on their own. The Shapley value for ﬁrm i when ﬁrm
25The somewhat ad-hoc assumption that the bargained outsourcing price should not
exceed any feasible alternative can be conceptualised by considering the following joint
bargaining/price competition framework. If ﬁrm 2 wins the contest, it enters into bar-
gaining with ﬁrm 1, since no other ﬁrm can oﬀer a more beneﬁcial outsourcing contract.
However, if any ﬁrm i ≥ 3 wins the contest, this ﬁr mm a yp l a yt h el o w e rc o s tﬁrms against
one another to obtain an outsourcing price of c2.






(n − m − 1)!
n!
[Π(M ∪ {i}) − Π(M)]
¾
. (24)
The Shapley value of ﬁrm i is determined by which ﬁrm is actually the winner
of the contest (ﬁrm j), since the value added to a random coalition by any one
ﬁrm is strongly determined by which ﬁrm is the winner. Since the Shapley
value averages the contributions a ﬁrm provides to all coalitions, it follows
that the winner of the contest always gets a relatively large share of the pie
—s i n c ew i t h o u tt h i sﬁrm, no coalition gets anything.




Pjφij − xi, (25)
from which we can derive the ﬁrst-order condition for optimal eﬀort in the
contest:










From (26) we can see that, in general, participation in the contest (i.e.,
xi > 0) requires that φii is not too low. This reﬂects the familiar result
that, in an asymmetric contest, ﬁrms that expect to have high eﬀective costs
if they win (or equivalently, a low valuation of the contested prize), do not
participate in the contest.
Unfortunately, it proves impossible to carry the analysis much further
without narrowing the focus. Thus, for the remainder of this Section, we
concentrate on the case of n =3 .U s i n gt h ed e ﬁnition of the Shapley value,
the three-ﬁrm case produces the following results for ex post payoﬀs:
φ21 = φ31 = φ32 =0 , (27)
φ11 = V − c1, (28)
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c3 +2 c2 − 3c1
6
. (30)
(27) states that the ﬁrms with higher costs than the winner get zero payoﬀs,
while (28) shows that there is no outsourcing if ﬁrm 1 wins, as expected.
On the other hand, if ﬁrm 2 wins the contest, (29) shows that ﬁrms 1 and 2
split the surplus in the same manner as in a 50/50 Nash bargaining solution.
If ﬁrm 3 is the winner, all ﬁrms get a positive share of the total available
surplus, as demonstrated by (30), although ﬁrm 1 gets a larger share of the
pie than ﬁrm 2. Furthermore, as long as ﬁrm 3 gets nothing unless it wins
the contest, a necessary condition for participation is that V>3c1+c2+2c3
6 .
Inserting the Shapley values given in (27)-(30) into (26), and solving for
individual eﬀorts, yield
x1 = x2 =
1
27
(6V − 3c1 − 2c2 − c3)
2
6V − 3c1 − c2 − 2c3
, (31)
x3 =
(6V − c3 − 2c2 − 3c1)
27
µ
2(V − c1)+4 ( V − c3)+c2 − c1
6V − 3c1 − c2 − 2c3
¶
. (32)
Total contest eﬀort is then given by
S3 =
6V − 3c1 − 2c2 − c3
9
. (33)
Like in the case of bilateral Nash bargaining, the production costs of all
ﬁrms matter for total contest eﬀort. We also see that the two lowest-cost
ﬁrms exert the same amount of eﬀort, and thus have the same probability
of winning the contest, even though ﬁrm 1 has higher expected proﬁts. This
reﬂects the previously discussed eﬀect of outsourcing reducing the incentives
of the lowest-cost ﬁrm to win the contest.
For the three-ﬁrm case, we can also use our parametric example to com-
pare total contest eﬀort in the diﬀerent regimes that we have considered.
For n =3 , the equilibrium levels of total eﬀort in the benchmark (BM), out-
sourcing with price competition (PC), Nash bargaining (NB) and cooperative




















(3 + α(2 + α)).
Straightforward comparisons show that SCB
3 >S PC
3 >S BM
3 .T o t a le ﬀort in
the Nash bargaining case relies heavily on the bargaining parameter β.A s -
suming equal bargaining strength between the winner and the subcontractor,











5 Contest design and welfare
Should a contest designer allow ex post outsourcing of production? This
depends, naturally, on the objective of the contest designer. A reasonable and
widely used assumption in the contest design literature is the maximization
of total contest eﬀort. The eﬀect of outsourcing on total eﬀort has been
analyzed in great detail in previous sections. The discussion so far suggests
that, by allowing for outsourcing, aggregate contest eﬀort increases if i) there
are more than only a few potential contestants and ii) the high cost ﬁrms have
a fair degree of ex post bargaining strength relative to the most eﬃcient ﬁrm.
With only two contestants, however, the possibility of outsourcing reduces
total eﬀort if the low-cost ﬁrm has suﬃcient bargaining power. There may be
more instruments available to the contest administrator, though. In the ﬁrst
part of this Section we extend the analysis to consider also the case where a
contest designer can collect entry fees from the contestants, along the lines
of Fullerton and McAfee (1999).
However, increased contest eﬀo r tm a yn o ta l w a y sbed e s i r a b l ef r o mav i e w -
point of social welfare. Bribery is an obvious example, but socially excessive
eﬀort is also a possibility in, say, a research contest. Long patent protection
or licensing periods (i.e., high prizes) may induce ineﬃciently high levels of
20eﬀort, and in any case, higher eﬀort also means lower aggregate proﬁts. In
the extreme case, were all eﬀort is considered to be socially wasteful, the
relevant welfare measure is aggregate proﬁts. Outsourcing improves ex post
allocative eﬃciency, but it may also induce more wasteful eﬀort in the con-
test. In the latter part of this Section we highlight the trade-oﬀ between
improved allocative eﬃciency and potential excessive eﬀort, induced by ex
post outsourcing.
5.1 Entry fees
The analysis in this subsection is closely related to Fullerton and McAfee
(1999). They analyze a situation where the contest designer is able to col-
lect entry fees, aiming to minimize the costs of inducing a given level of
eﬀort. Assuming a uniform entry fee, E, if the contest designer wants n
ﬁrms to participate, he must choose the entry fee such that ﬁrm n makes
non-negative expected proﬁts while ﬁrm (n +1 ) makes negative expected
proﬁts. Of course, there is no reason to let the n’th ﬁrm have any surplus,
so the expected proﬁts of this ﬁrm equals the optimal entry fee, i.e., πn = E.
Fullerton and McAfee (1999) show that, for a large class of contests, the
optimal number of contestants which should be chosen in order to induce
a given total eﬀort at lowest possible procurement costs, Ω := V − nE,i s
two.26 Here, we extend their analysis by asking whether ex post outsourcing
should be allowed, restricting our attention to the two-ﬁrm case.
Benchmark: No outsourcing
In the non-outsourcing benchmark case with two ﬁrms, the prize V needed
to induce aggregate contest eﬀort S is given by
S =
(V − c1)(V − c2)
2V − c1 − c2
. (34)
26The intuition goes as follows. A lower number of contestants increases the spending
(prize) needed to induce a given level of eﬀort, but this is outweighed by the possibility to
set higher entry fees due to higher expected proﬁts of the remaining contestants. Similar
results are found by Taylor (1995) and Che and Gale (2003).















The optimal entry fee is given by E = π2, yielding
E =




where V is given by (35). Total procurement costs for inducing eﬀort S in
the benchmark case are then given by
Ω







(1 + 2λ) − 1












Now consider the possibility of allowing ex post outsourcing. With two
contestants, asymmetric Nash bargaining for the price of the subcontract en-
compasses all feasible possibilities, yielding outsourcing prices in the interval
[c1,c 2], depending on the bargaining parameter β. From (22), total contest




[V − c1 − (1 − β)(c2 − c1)]. (38)
Thus, inducing a level of eﬀort S necessitates a contest prize
V =2 S +( 1− β)c2 + βc1, (39)





22Perhaps surprisingly, we see that inducing a given level of eﬀort always yields
the same proﬁts for ﬁrm 2, regardless of the ex post outsourcing arrange-
ments. In other words, regardless of the division of ex post surplus, if a
contest administrator wants to induce eﬀort S, the highest entry fee she can
take is S/2 to ensure that two ﬁrms will participate in the contest.
Total procurement costs with ex post outsourcing are then given by
Ω
NB = S + βc1 +( 1− β)c2. (41)
The eﬀect of outsourcing on total procurement costs are given by a compar-
ison of (37) and (41). We see that ΩNB < ΩBM for all β ∈ (0,1) if the terms
in square brackets in (37) exceed 1. It is easily veriﬁed that this is always the
case.27 Thus, ex post outsourcing should always be allowed in the two-ﬁrm
case when the contest administrator can collect entry fees.
The intuition is the following. Consider ﬁrst the case where β is relatively
high. Then outsourcing raises total contest eﬀort, due to increased eﬀort
incentives for the high-cost ﬁrm, implying that a given level of eﬀort can be
induced by oﬀering a lower prize. Furthermore, a larger share of aggregate
proﬁts can be captured by the entry fee. In the limit case of β → 1,b o t h
ﬁrms have the same expected proﬁts, all of which are captured by the optimal
entry fee. In sum, total procurement costs decline.
On the other hand, if β is relatively low, we know that outsourcing always
reduces total eﬀort, due to the reduced incentives of the low-cost ﬁrm to
exert eﬀort in the contest. This must be compensated for by a higher contest
prize, which — all else equal — increases total procurement costs. However,
the reduction of ﬁrm 1’s contest eﬀort raises the expected proﬁts of ﬁrm 2 in
equilibrium, which implies that a higher entry fee can be collected while still
inducing ﬁrm 2 to participate in the contest. This more than oﬀsets the prize
increase, implying that total procurement costs decline also in this case.
We summarize our results as follows.







1+λ2 > 0.I tc a nb ev e r i ﬁed that this expression has
a single positively valued maximum for λ = 3
4 and approaches zero in the limits (λ → 0
and λ →∞ ).
23Proposition 5 With two contestants, the possibility of ex post outsourcing
reduces total procurement costs when entry fees can be collected.
5.2 Socially wasteful eﬀort
Finally, to deal with the question of socially wasteful eﬀort, we now make the
extreme assumption that all contest eﬀort is considered socially wasteful or
unwanted. We can think of such eﬀort as lobbying or bribery undertaken by
ﬁrms in order to increase the probability of being awarded, e.g., a government
contract.28 Is the possibility of ex post outsourcing likely to be socially
beneﬁcial in this case?
When eﬀort is socially wasteful, the reasonable measure of social welfare
is expected aggregate proﬁts. The possibility of outsourcing improves ex
post allocative eﬃciency, which is unambiguously positive from a welfare
perspective. However, it may also increase incentives for socially wasteful
eﬀort. We can capture this trade-oﬀ by maintaining our two-ﬁrm example
with asymmetric Nash bargaining for the subcontract.
Without outsourcing, individual and total contest eﬀorts, respectively,






V (V − c1 − c2)+c2
1 + c2
2 − c1c2
2V − c1 − c2
. (42)
On the other hand, with ex post outsourcing, we saw in Section 4 that the
contest becomes perfectly symmetric with two ﬁrms. Total eﬀort is given by








[V − c1 +( 1− β)(c2 − c1)]. (43)
28Clark and Riis (2000) study allocational eﬃciency in bribery contests for governmental
contracts. Ex post outsourcing of the contract is not an issue, though.



















For the special case of β =0 ,w h e r et h em o s te ﬃcient ﬁrm dictates the
terms of the subcontract, the possibility of ex post outsourcing unambigu-
ously improves social welfare. Wasteful eﬀort is reduced, due to the reduced
eﬀort incentives of the most eﬃcient ﬁrm, and ex post allocative eﬃciency is
improved.
However, outsourcing is less likely to be socially beneﬁcial the higher is β.
The reason is that a higher level of β increases incentives for socially wasteful
eﬀort when ex post outsourcing is a possibility. More bargaining strength
to the least eﬃcient ﬁrm increases this ﬁrm’s net valuation of winning the
contest, with a corresponding stronger incentive to exert eﬀort. At the same
time, the low-cost ﬁrm also gets a stronger incentive to win the contest, since
ah i g h e rβ implies that the subcontract becomes less proﬁtable for this ﬁrm
if it does not win the contest.
From (44) we see that outsourcing will in fact reduce expected aggregate
proﬁts for suﬃciently high levels of β if
3(V − c2)
2V − c1 − c2
< 1, (45)
which can be expressed as
V − c2 <c 2 − c1. (46)
In words, this condition states that the net valuation of the high-cost ﬁrm
in the absence of outsourcing must be lower than the cost diﬀerence between
the ﬁrms. If this is the case, the high-cost ﬁrm has low incentives to exert
eﬀort in the contest, absent outsourcing, relative to the low-cost ﬁrm. Thus,
the probability that the most eﬃcient ﬁrm will win the contest anyway is
relatively high. This implies, in turn, that the improved allocative eﬃciency
due to outsourcing is relatively moderate, and outweighed by the eﬀect of
25increased total eﬀort for suﬃciently high level of β. In other words, if V −c2 <
c2 − c1, there exists a critical value β
∗ < 1 such that outsourcing is socially
detrimental if β ∈ (β
∗,1).
6 Concluding remarks
We have analyzed the strategic eﬀects and implications of ex post outsourcing
in situations where competition between ﬁrms take on the characteristics of
an imperfectly discriminating contest. While horizontal outsourcing is often
thought to facilitate collusion, we have shown that such arrangements might
instead increase competition between ﬁrms in a majority of cases. With re-
spect to contest design, whether or not such competition is desirable depends
both on the interpretation of the model and the objective of the contest or-
ganizer. In a procurement contest, allowing outsourcing might increase the
quality of the procured good, for example through higher R&D investments
by the contestants, but it might also increase incentives for lobbying and
bribery.
In order to improve the tractability of our analysis, we have made some
simplifying assumptions. Among these is the assumption that, in case of ex
post outsourcing, all production is outsourced to a lower-cost ﬁrm. In reality,
though, we usually observe that only part of the initial contract is outsourced.
However, the eﬀect of such partial outsourcing can quite easily be interpreted
within our modelling framework. In general, the lower share of production
that is subject to ex post outsourcing, the higher are the eﬀective ex post
production costs for all but the most eﬃcient ﬁrm. In the Nash bargaining
version of our model, this is equivalent to a higher relative bargaining strength
for the subcontractor, which — all else equal — reduce total contest eﬀort.
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